On the open-loop Nash equilibrium in LQ-games. by Engwerda, J.C.









In this paper we consider open-loop Nash equilibria of the linear-quadratic
diﬀerential game. We present both necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
existence of a unique solution for the ﬁnite-planning horizon case, and show
that there exist situations where the set of associated Riccati diﬀerential
equations has no solution, whereas the problem does have an equilibrium.
The pursued analyses allows a simple study of convergence of the equilib-
rium strategy if the planning horizon expands. Conditions are given under
which this strategy converges. A detailed study of the inﬁnite planning hori-
zon case is given. In particular we show that, in general, this problem has not
a unique equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that the limit of the above men-
tioned converged strategy may be not an equilibrium for the inﬁnite planning
horizon problem. Particular attention is paid to computational aspects and
the scalar case.
Keywords: Linear quadratic games, open-loop Nash equilibrium, solvability
conditions, Riccati equations
2I. Introduction
During the last decade there has been an increasing interest to study several
problems in economics using a dynamic game theoretical setting. In par-
ticular in the area of environmental economics and macro-economic policy
coordination this is a very natural framework to model problems (see e.g.
de Zeeuw et al. (1991), M¨ aler (1992), Kaitala et al. (1992) and Dockner et
al. (1985), Tabellini (1986), Fershtman et al. (1987), Petit (1989), Levine
et al. (1994), van Aarle et al. (1995), Neck et al. (1995), Douven et al
(1996)). In, e.g., policy coordination problems usually two basic questions
arise i.e., ﬁrst, are policies coordinated and, second, which information do
the participating parties have. Usually both these points are rather unclear
and, therefore, strategies for diﬀerent possible scenarios are calculated and
compared with eachother. One of these scenarios is the so-called open-loop
strategy. This scenario can be interpreted as that the parties simultaneously
determine their strategy, next submit their strategies to some authority who
then enforces these plans as binding commitments. So, this strategy is based
on the assumption that the parties act non-cooperatively and that the only
information they have on the model is its present state and the model struc-
ture. In other words, open-loop decisions concern control functions of time
only. Obviously, since according this scenario the participating parties can
not react to eachother’s policies, its economic relevance is mostly rather lim-
ited. However, as a benchmark to see how much parties can gain by playing
other strategies, it plays a fundamental role. Due to its analytic tractabil-
ity the open-loop Nash equilibrium strategy is in particular very popular for
problems where the underlying model can be described by a (set of) linear
diﬀerential equation(s) and the individual objectives, the parties are striving
for, can be approximated by functions which quadratically penalize devia-
tions from some (equilibrium) targets. Under the assumption that the parties
only have a ﬁnite-planning horizon, this problem was ﬁrst modeled and solved
in a mathematically rigorous way by Starr and Ho in (1969). However, due
to some inaccurate formulations it is, even in nowadays literature, an often
encountered misunderstanding that this problem always has a unique Nash
equilibrium strategy which can be obtained in terms of the solutions of a set
of coupled matrix diﬀerential equations resembling (but more complicated
than) the matrix Riccati equations which arise in optimal regulator theory.
Eisele, who extended the Hilbert space approach of this problem taken by
Lukes et al (1971), in (1982) already noted that there are some misleading
formulations in the literature. But, probably due to the rather abstract ap-
proach he took, this point was not noted in the mainstream literature. So, in
other words, there exist situations where the set of coupled matrix diﬀerential
equations has no solution, whereas the problem does have an equilibrium. We
will present such an example here and use the more direct simple Hamiltonian
3approach to analyze the problem. In addition to its simplicity this approach
has the advantage that it also permits an elementary geometric study of con-
vergence of the equilibrium strategy if the planning horizon expands. Like
in the optimal regulator theory it turns out that under some conditions it
can be shown that this strategy converges. One nice property of this con-
verged solution is, as we will see, that it is rather easy to calculate and much
easier to implement than any ﬁnite planning horizon equilibrium solution.
One would expect that this (converged) solution also solves the problem if
the parties consider an inﬁnite-planning horizon. Remarkably, however, the
author was not able to trace a reference in literature dealing with this subject
in a rigorous mathematical way. Particularly in the economic literature one
usually sticks to considering the limiting behaviour of the discounted version
of the above mentioned ﬁnite-planning horizon solution, and imposes some
additional constraints (e.g. the no-Ponzi game condition (see e.g. van Aarle
et al. (1995)) or transversality condition (see e.g. Neck et al. (1995))) on
the solution of this problem.
The reason for studying an inﬁnite-planning horizon can be motivated from
at least two reasons. First, in economic growth theory it is usually diﬃcult
to justify the assumption that a ﬁrm (or government) has a ﬁnite-planning
horizon tf; for, why should it ignore proﬁts earned after tf (or utility of gen-
erations alive beyond tf). Second, we will see that from a computational
point of view the equilibrium strategies are much easier to implement and
analyze than those for a ﬁnite-planning horizon.
We will solve here the inﬁnite-planning horizon problem in a rigorous way.
We like to point out already two remarkable points that we will see. First,
we will see that although the problem may have a unique equilibrium strat-
egy for an arbitrary ﬁnite-planning horizon, there may exist more than one
equilibrium solution for the inﬁnite-planning horizon case and, second, the
limit of this unique ﬁnite-planning horizon equilibrium solution may be not a
solution for the inﬁnite-planning horizon problem. On the other hand we will
see that it can be easily veriﬁed whether the limiting solution of the ﬁnite-
planning horizon problem solves also the inﬁnite-planning horizon case.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section two we start by stating
the problem analysed in this paper and show how both a necessary and suf-
ﬁcient condition, in terms of a rank condition on a matrix, can be derived
for the existence of a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium using the Hamil-
tonian approach. Moreover, we present the relationship that exists between
solvability of a set of Riccati diﬀerential equations and solvability of the prob-
lem. Before we present the convergence results of the ﬁnite-planning horizon
equilibrium solution in section 4, we ﬁrst consider the algebraic equations
associated with the set of Riccati diﬀerential equations, and their solutions.
In section 3 we show how all solutions of these equations can be determined
from the eigenstructure of a certain matrix M. It turns out that the eigenval-
4ues of the associated closed-loop system, obtained by applying the limiting
equilibrium strategy, are completely determined by the eigenvalues of this
matrix M. A number of the results presented in sections 3 an 4 are also
reported by Abou-Kandil et al. (1993). Their presentation is, however, of
a more analytic nature. Since the easiest way to present our results on the
inﬁnite-planning horizon is in geometric terms, it is more convenient to have
a geometric formulation of their results too. Therefore we choose to give here
a selfcontained geometric exposition including their results. The results on
the inﬁnite-planning horizon case are discussed in section 5. In particular we
show that if the participating parties discount their future objectives, then
the ﬁnite-planning horizon equilibrium solution converges to a limit. Gener-
ically, this limit is the unique solution to the inﬁnite-plannning horizon case
if the discount factor is large enough. Finally, in section 6 we study the
scalar case which is of particular interest for many economic applications.
We show that in the scalar case, under a mild regularity condition, every-
thing works out ﬁne. This, in the sense that the ﬁnite-planning equilibrium
solution can be obtained by solving the set of Riccati diﬀerential equations
and that the equilibrium solution converges to a stationary policy which sta-
bilizes the closed-loop dynamics of the system. Furthermore this strategy is
the unique equilibrium strategy of the inﬁnite-planning horizon problem. By
a stationary policy we mean in this context a policy which can be rewritten
as a linear time-invariant function of the state of the system.
The paper ends with some concluding remarks. Parts of this paper were
also reported in Engwerda et al. (1994,1995), Weeren (1995) and Engwerda
(1996).
II. The ﬁnite-planning horizon case
In this paper we consider the problem where two parties (henceforth called
players) try to minimize their individual quadratic performance criterion.
Each player controls a diﬀerent set of inputs to a single system. The system
is described by a diﬀerential equation of arbitrary order. As already men-
tioned in the introduction we assume that both players have to formulate
their strategy already at the moment the system starts to evolve, and this
strategy can not be changed once the system runs. So, the players have to
minimize their performance criterion based on the information that they only
know the diﬀerential equation and its initial state. We are looking now for
combinations of pairs of strategies of both players which are secure against
any attempt by one player to unilaterally alter his strategy. That is, for
those pairs of strategies which are such that if one player deviates from his
strategy he will only lose. In the literature on dynamic games this problem is
5well-known as the open-loop Nash non-zero-sum linear quadratic diﬀerential
game (see e.g. Starr and Ho (1969), Simaan and Cruz (1973), Ba¸ sar and
Olsder (1982) or Abou-Kandil and Bertrand (1986)). Formally the system
we consider is as follows:
˙ x = Ax + B1u1 + B2u2,x (0) = x0. (1)
Here x is the n-dimensional state of the system, ui is an mi-dimensional
(control) vector player i can manipulate, x0 is the arbitrarily chosen initial
state of the system, A,B1,a n dB2 are constant matrices of appropriate di-
mensions, and ˙ x denotes the time derivative of x.




























All matrices that occur in the performance criteria are symmetric. Moreover,
both Qi and Kif are semi-positive deﬁnite and Rii are positive deﬁnite.
In this section we consider in detail the existence of a unique open-loop Nash
equilibrium of this diﬀerential game. Due to the stated assumptions both cost
functionals Ji,i=1 ,2, are strictly convex functions of ui for all admissible
control functions uj,j  = i and for all x0. This implies that the conditions
following from the minimum principle are both necessary and suﬃcient (see
e.g. Ba¸ sar and Olsder (1982, section 6.5)).








i (Ax + B1u1 + B2u2),i =1 ,2
with respect to ui yields the optimality conditions (see e.g. Ba¸ sar and Olsder















where the n-dimensional vectors ψ1(t)a n dψ2(t) satisfy
˙ ψ1(t)=−Q1x(t) − A
Tψ1(t), with ψ1(tf)=K1fx(tf)
˙ ψ2(t)=−Q2x(t) − A
Tψ2(t), with ψ2(tf)=K2fx(tf)
and
˙ x(t)=Ax(t) − S1ψ1(t) − S2ψ2(t); x(0) = x0.




In other words, the problem has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium if and
























with boundary conditions x(0) = x0,ψ 1(tf) − K1fx(tf)=0a n dψ2(tf) −
K2fx(tf)=0 , has a unique solution. Denoting the state variable (xT(t) ψT
1 (t) ψT
2 (t))T
by y(t), we can rewrite this two-point boundary value problem in the stan-
dard form


























From (4) we have immediately that problem (1) has a unique open-loop Nash













is uniquely solvable, for an arbitrary choice of x0. It is easily veriﬁed that
this is equivalent with the requirement that Pe Mtf + Q is invertible.
Using the following notation:
H(tf): =W11(tf)+W12(tf)K1f + W13(tf)K2f,
with W(tf)=( Wij(tf)) {i,j =1 ,2,3; Wij ∈ Rn×n} := exp(Mtf),
elementary matrix analysis then shows that (see also Engwerda et al. (1994))
Theorem 1:
The two-player linear quadratic diﬀerential game (1) has a unique open-loop
Nash equilibrium for every initial state if and only if matrix H(tf) is invert-
ible. Moreover, the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution as well as the asso-
ciated state trajectory can be calculated from the linear two-point boundary
value problem (4). 
Next, consider the following set of coupled asymmetric Riccati-type diﬀeren-
tial equations:
˙ K1 = −A
TK1 − K1A − Q1 + K1S1K1 + K1S2K2; K1(tf)=K1f (6)
7˙ K2 = −A
TK2 − K2A − Q2 + K2S2K2 + K2S1K1; K2(tf)=K2f (7)
Remark 2:
1) In the sequel we will denote solutions satisfying these equations (6,7)
by Ki(t,tf). Also the notation Ki(t) (or even Ki) will be used if it is
clear which endpoint tf is meant.
2) Note that the solutions Ki(t,tf) are, in general, not symmetric since
both equations (6,7) contain just a term KiSjKj and no factor KjSjKi.
3) From the equations (6,7) it is clear that whenever Ki(t,tf) exists, then
for any δ>0, also Ki(t+δ,tf +δ) exists and equals Ki(t,tf). That is,
the diﬀerential equations are time-invariant.












where Φ(t,0) is the solution of the transition equation ˙ Φ(t,0) = (A−S1K1(t)−
S2K2(t))Φ(t,0); Φ(0,0) = I.
Now, deﬁne ψi(t): =Ki(t)Φ(t,0)x0. Then, obviously ˙ ψi(t)= ˙ Ki(t)Φ(t,0)x0+
Ki(t) ˙ Φ(t,0)x0.
Substitution of ˙ Ki from (6,7) and ˙ Φ(t,0) yields
˙ ψi =( −A
TKi − Qi)Φ(t,0)x0 = −A
Tψi − QiΦ(t,0)x0.
It is now easily veriﬁed that x(t): =Φ ( t,0)x0,ψ 1(t),ψ 2(t) satisfy the two-
point boundary value problem (4), for an arbitrarily choice of x0.O r ,s t a t e d
diﬀerently, (5) has a solution for an arbitrary choice of x0. Elementary linear
algebra shows that consequently H(tf) must be invertible. So, according the-
orem 1 the game has a unique equilibrium. Concluding, this gives a robust
proof of the next theorem stated by Starr and Ho in (1969):
Theorem 3:
If the set of Riccati equations (6,7) has a solution then the two-player linear
quadratic diﬀerential game (1) has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium for
every initial state.
Moreover, the equilibrium strategies are then given by (8,9). 
The following example shows that there exist situations where the set of
Riccati diﬀerential equations (6,7) does not have a solution, whereas there

































, and R22 =1 .
















K2f =: V ∗ (IK 1f K2f)
T.






,w i t hh1 =
−V (1,2)−V (2,3)−V (2,5)∗10









,w i t hh2 =
−V (2,2)−V (2,3)∗K1f(1,2)−V (2,4)∗K1f(2,2)
V (2,5) . Then,
clearly, both K1f and K2f are positive deﬁnite whereas the last row of H(0.1)






So, according to theorem 1 the game has not a unique open-loop Nash equi-
librium for every initial state. Using the converse statement of theorem 3,
this implies that the corresponding set of Riccati diﬀerential equations has
no solution.
Next consider H(0.11). Numerical calculation shows that with the system
parameters as chosen above, H(0.11) is invertible. So, according to theorem
1 again, the game does have an open-loop Nash equilibrium for tf =0 .11.
Since in this example Ki(t,0.1) does not exist for all t ∈ [0,0.1], we conclude
(see remark 2.3) that Ki(t,0.11) neither exists for all t ∈ [0.01,0.11]. So, the
game does have a solution, whereas the set of Riccati diﬀerential equations
has no solution. 
Note that the above theorems are in fact local results. That is, they make
just statements concerning existence of an equilibrium strategy for a ﬁxed
endpoint tf in time. Below we show that existence of an equilibrium strategy
for the game deﬁned on the interval [0,t f] for all tf ∈ [0,t 1]i se q u i v a l e n tt o
the existence of a solution to the set of Riccati diﬀerential equations (6,7) on
the interval [0,t 1].
One part of this conjecture is rather immediate. Assume that we know that
the set of Riccati diﬀerential equations has a solution on [0,t 1]. Then, see
remark 2.3, also a solution Ki(t,tf) exists to this set of equations on the
9interval [0,t f], for every point tf ∈ [0,t 1]. So, according theorem 3 there will
exist an open-loop equilibrium strategy for the game deﬁned on the interval
[0,t f], for every choice of tf ∈ [0,t 1].
Next, consider the other part of this conjecture. That is, assume that the
open-loop game has a solution on the interval [0,t f] for all tf ∈ [0,t 1]. Then,











Since y(t)=e−Mty0, it follows that the entries of y(t) can be rewritten as






























Using the previously introduced notation for H(t), we see that (10) can be
rewritten as x(t)=H(t1 − t)H−1(t1)x0.
Since by assumption H(tf) is invertible for all tf ∈ [0,t 1]( s e et h e o r e m
1), in particular matrix H(t1 − t) is invertible. Therefore, it follows that
H−1(t1)x0 = H−1(t1 − t)x(t).
Substitution of this expression into the equations for ψi,i=1 ,2, in (11,12)
yields:
ψ1(t)=G1(t1 − t)H
−1(t1 − t)x(t) and (13)
ψ2(t)=G2(t1 − t)H
−1(t1 − t)x(t) (14)
for some continuously diﬀerentiable matrix functions Gi,i=1 ,2, and H−1(.).
Now, denote Gi(t1 −t)H−1(t1 −t)b yKi(t),i=1 ,2. Then, from (13), (14) it
follows that ˙ ψi = ˙ Kix + Ki ˙ x,i =1 ,2.
F r o m( 2 , 3 )w eh a v et h a tψ1(t)a n dψ2(t) satisfy
˙ ψ1(t)=−Q1x(t) − A
Tψ1(t), with ψ1(t1)=K1fx(t1),
˙ ψ2(t)=−Q2x(t) − A
Tψ2(t), with ψ2(t1)=K2fx(t1)
and
˙ x(t)=Ax(t) − S1ψ1(t) − S2ψ2(t); x(0) = x0.
10Substitution of ˙ ψi and ψi,i=1 ,2 into these formulas yields
( ˙ K1+A
TK1+K1A+Q1−K1S1K1−K1S2K2)e
Mtx0 =0w i t h( K1(t1)−K1f)e
Mt1x0 =0 , and
( ˙ K2+A
TK2+K2A+Q2−K2S2K2−K2S1K1)e
Mtx0 =0w i t h( K2(t1)−K2f)e
Mt1x0 =0 ,
for arbitrarily chosen x0.
From this it follows that Ki(t),i=1 ,2 satisfy the set of Riccati diﬀerential
equations (6,7). This proves the following result:
Theorem 5:
The following statements are equivalent:
1) For all tf ∈ [0,t 1] there exists a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium for
the two-player linear quadratic diﬀerential game (1) deﬁned on the interval
[0,t f].
2) H(t) is invertible for all tf ∈ [0,t 1].
3) The set of Riccati diﬀerential equations (6,7) has a solution on [0,t 1]. 
The above theorem shows that for both computational purposes and for
a better theoretical understanding of the open-loop problem it would be nice
to have a global existence result for the set of Riccati diﬀerential equations
(6,7). Up to now this is, however, an unsolved problem. Suﬃcient condi-
tions in literature on this subject are reported by e.g. Abou-Kandil et al.
(1986), which result was generalized and proved in a rigorous way by Feucht
in (1994).
III. The solutions for the algebraic Riccati equation
In this section we consider the set of solutions satisfying the set of so-called
algebraic Riccati equations corresponding to (6,7)
0=−ATK1 − K1A − Q1 + K1S1K1 + K1S2K2;
0=−ATK2 − K2A − Q2 + K2S2K2 + K2S1K1;
 
(ARE)
MacFarlane (1963) and Potter (1966) independently discovered that there
exists a relationship between the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Ric-
cati equation and the eigenvectors of a related Hamiltonian matrix in linear
quadratic regulator problems. We will follow their approach and formulate
similar results for our problem (1). Abou-Kandil et al. in (1993) already
pointed out the existence of such a similar relationship. One of their results
is that if the planning horizon tf in (1) tends to inﬁnity, under some tech-
nical conditions on the matrix M, the solution of the above mentioned set
11of Riccati diﬀerential equations converges to a solution of the set of (ARE).
This solution can be calculated from the eigenspaces of matrix M. We will
reformulate their result geometrically. This makes it possible to understand
better their technical assumptions (and to give a less technical proof). On
the other hand this approach makes it possible to relate easily results on the
converged ﬁnite-planning horizon equilibrium solution to equilibrium solu-
tions of the inﬁnite-planning horizon game.
Moreover, we elaborate on the relationship between solutions of (ARE) and
matrix M in detail. We present both necessary and suﬃcient conditions in
terms of the matrix M under which (ARE) has (a) real solution(s). In par-
ticular we will see that all solutions of (ARE) can be calculated from the
invariant subspaces of M. Furthermore we will see that the eigenvalues of
the associated closed-loop system, obtained by applying the control (8,9),
are completely determined by the eigenvalues of matrix M. As a corollary
from these results we obtain both necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of a stabilizing control of this type. This result will also be used in
the next section.
In our analysis the set of all M-invariant subspaces plays a crucial role.
Therefore we introduce a separate notation for this set:
Minv := {T |MT⊂ T} .
It is well-known (see e.g. Lancaster and Tismenetsky (1985)) that this set
contains only a ﬁnite number of (distinct) elements if and only if all eigen-
values of M have a geometric multiplicity one.
The set of possible solutions for the algebraic Riccati equation can, as will
be shown in the next theorem, be calculated directly from the following col-
lection of M-invariant subspaces:
Kpos :=
 











Here the symbol ⊕ is used to denote the orthogonal sum of subspaces.















12The exact result on how all solutions of (ARE) can be calculated is given
in the next theorem. Here we use the notation M|K to denote the restric-
tion of the linear transformation induced by M to the subspace K (see e.g.
Lancaster et al. (1985, p.142)). Furthermore we use the notation σ(X)t o
denote the spectrum of a matrix X. The proof of this theorem can be found
in the appendix.
Theorem 6:
(ARE) has a real solution (K1,K 2) if and only if K1 = YX −1 and K2 = ZX−1












i KiΦ(t)x0 are used to con-
trol the system (1), the spectrum of the closed-loop matrix A−S1K1−S2K2
coincides with σ(−M|K). 
From the above theorem a number of interesting properties concerning the
solvability of (ARE) follow. First of all we observe that every element of
Kpos deﬁnes exactly one solution of (ARE). Consequently, (ARE) will have
no real solution if and only if Kpos is empty. Furthermore, this set contains
a ﬁnite number of elements if the geometric multiplicities of all eigenvalues
of M is one. So, in that case we immediately conclude that (ARE) will have
at most a ﬁnite number of solutions.
Another immediate conclusion is that whenever matrix M has an invariant
subspace K∈K pos, such that all eigenvalues of (M|K) are positive, then all
eigenvalues of the corresponding closed-loop matrix A−S1K1−S2K2 will be
negative. That the reverse statement also holds is easily veriﬁed too. So, we
have
Corollary 7:
(ARE) will have a set of solutions (K1,K 2) stabilizing the closed-loop system
matrix A−S1K1 −S2K2 i fa n do n l yi ft h e r ee x i s t sa nM-invariant subspace
K in Kpos such that Re λ>0 for all λ ∈ σ(M|K). 
To illustrate some of the above mentioned properties, reconsider example
4.
Example 4 (continued):
It can be shown analytically that both −5
22 and −1
2 are eigenvalues of M with
algebraic multiplicities 2 and 1, respectively, whereas both their geomet-
ric multiplicity is 1. Numerical calculations show that the other eigenval-
ues of M are −1.8810,−0.1883 and 1.7966. Rearranging the eigenvalues as
13{−5
22,−1.8810,−0.1883, −1
2 ,1.7966} we have that M has the following corre-
sponding (generalized) eigenspaces:
T11 = Span{T11} where T11 =( 000001 )
T,
T12 = Span{T11 T12} where T12 =( −0.2024 0.6012 − 0.2620 − 0.0057 0.5161 0)
T;
T2 = Span{T2} where T2 =( −0.3726 − 0.2006 0.42290 0 .6505 0.4679)
T;
T3 = Span{T3} where T3 =( 0 .0079 − 0.0234 0.0097 0 − 0.0191 − 0.9995)
T;
T4 = Span{T4} where T4 =( 0 .0580 − 0.1596 0.1160 0 − 0.2031 0.9573)
T;
and
T5 = Span{T5} where T5 =( −0.7274 − 0.1657 − 0.2601 0 − 0.3194 − 0.5232)
T.
Note that T12 / ∈K pos since it violates the rank condition. For the same rea-






= 6 diﬀerent 2-dimensional M-invariant subspaces remain as
candidate elements of Kpos. Obviously, none of these candidate solutions will
stabilize the closed-loop system matrix.







 := (T2 T3). This yields the solution























i KiΦ(t)x0,i=1 ,2, are {1.8810,0.1883}. It is easily veriﬁed
that the rank of the ﬁrst two rows of every other candidate solution is also
two, so we conclude that (ARE) has six solutions, none of which is stabiliz-
ing. 
IV. Convergence results
As argued in the introduction, it is interesting to see how the open-loop
equilibrium solution changes when the planning horizon tf tends to inﬁnity.
To study convergence properties of the equilibrium solution for the game, it
seems reasonable to require that problem (1) has a properly deﬁned solution
for every ﬁnite planning horizon. Therefore in this section we will make the
following well-posedness assumption (see theorem 5)
H(tf) is invertible for all tf < ∞. (15)
Of course, this assumption is diﬃcult to verify in practice. It stresses once
14more the need to ﬁnd general conditions under which the set of Riccati dif-
ferential equations (6,7) will have a solution on (0,∞).
Furthermore, to derive general convergence results, we will assume that the
eigenstructure of matrix M satisﬁes an additional property, which we deﬁne
ﬁrst.
Deﬁnition 8:
M is called dichotomically separable if there exist subspaces V1 and V2 such
that MVi ⊂ Vi,i=1 ,2, V1 ⊕ V2 =I R









Moreover, Vi should be such that Re λ>Re µ for all λ ∈ σ(M|V1),µ ∈
σ(M|V2). 
From theorem 5 we know that assumption (15) implies that, to study the
convergence of the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution, we can restrict our-
selves to the study of Ki(0,t f), if tf increases (see also remark 2.3). Note
that Ki(0,t f) can be viewed as the solution k(t) of an autonomous vector dif-
ferential equation ˙ k = f(k), with k(0) = k0 for some ﬁxed k0,a n dw h e r efi s
a smooth function. Elementary analysis shows then that Ki(0,t f)c o n v e r g e s
to a limit ¯ k only if this limit ¯ k satisﬁes f(¯ k) = 0. Therefore, we immediately
deduce from theorem 6 the following necessary condition for convergence.
Lemma 9:
Ki(0,t f) can only converge to a limit ¯ Ki(0) if the set Kpos is nonempty. 
Note that dichotomic separability of M implies that Kpos is nonempty. On the
other hand it is not diﬃcult to construct an example where Kpos is nonempty,
whereas M is not dichotomically separable.
In the appendix we give an elementary proof of the following result (see also
Abou-Kandil et al (1993, section 4))
Theorem 10:
Assume that the well-posedness assumption (15) holds.









K1(0,t f) → Y0X
−1
0 , and K2(0,t f) → Z0X
−1
0 .





15Combination of the results from theorem 10 and corollary 7 yields then
Corollary 11:
Assume that the planning horizon tf in the diﬀerential game (1) tends to
inﬁnity and the following conditions are satisﬁed
1. all conditions mentioned in theorem 10
2. Re λ>0,∀λ ∈ σ(M|V1).









where Φ(t,0) satisﬁes the transition equation ˙ Φ(t,0) = (A−S1K1−S2K2)Φ(t,0);
Φ(0,0) = I.
In these equations the constant matrices Ki,i=1 ,2, can be calculated from
the eigenspaces of matrix M (see theorem 10), and the strategies will stabilize
the closed-loop system. 
V. The inﬁnite-planning horizon case
In this section we assume that the performance criterion player i =1 ,2






















Here matrix Rii is positive deﬁnite, Qi is semi-positive deﬁnite and addition-
ally is positive deﬁnite w.r.t. the controllability subspace <A ,B i >, i =1 ,2.
Compared to (1), note that each player’s performance criterion does not in-
clude the cross term, penalizing the control eﬀorts of the other player, any-
more. We dropped this term here since it does not play a role in the analysis
and therefore only would unnecessarily complicate the presented proofs.
The information structure is similar to the ﬁnite-planning horizon case. Each
player only knows the initial state of the system and has to choose a con-
trol for the entire inﬁnite time horizon. So, the actions are now described
as functions of time, where time runs from zero to inﬁnity. Since we only
16like to consider those outcomes of the game that yield a ﬁnite cost to both








tf→∞Ji(u1,u 2) < ∞,i =1 ,2.}
The basic result of this section is summarized in the next theorem:
Theorem 12:
The inﬁnite-planning horizon two-player linear quadratic diﬀerential game






and only if there exist K1 and K2 that are solutions of the algebraic Riccati
equations (ARE) satisfying the additional constraint that the eigenvalues of
Acl := A − S1K1 − S2K2 are all situated in the left half complex plane.






where Φ(t,0) satisﬁes the transition equation ˙ Φ(t,0) = AclΦ(t,0); Φ(0,0) =
I, is an open-loop Nash equilibrium strategy.











1) Parts of the proof of this theorem can be substituted by using the
results of Haurie et al. (1984, lemma 5.1). This requires, however,
the introduction of the concept of weak overtaking optimality. In this
framework it is not required that the state or the performance criterion
converge (see Halkin (1974)). Since we like to stay in the framework
of bounded performance criteria, we choose to give an elementary self-
contained proof of this theorem.
2) In the above theorem the costs for the individual players are expressed
as an integral. In fact, analogously to the optimal LQ regulator the-
ory, we have that the costs can be obtained indirectly by solving the
following associated Lyapunov equations1
A
T
clMi + MiAcl + Qi + K
T
i SiKi =0 , (16)
1I like to thank Arie Weeren for pointing out this to me
17where Acl := A − S1K1 − S2K2,i = 1 , 2 .
Note that since all eigenvalues of Acl are in the left half complex plane
and Qi + KT
i SiKi ≥ 0, this equation has a unique positive semi-
deﬁnite solution Mi. Therefore, using the notation x(t): =eAcltx0,w e
have Ji(¯ u1, ¯ u2)=
  ∞
0 x(t)T(Qi+KT












3) It is clear now that the control strategies presented in corollary 11 will
also be equilibrium strategies for the inﬁnite planning horizon game.
So, the study of the equilibria of our LQ game boils down to the study of all
M-invariant subspaces K in Kpos for which Re λ>0 for all λ ∈ σ(M|K).
The next example shows that in general the inﬁnite-planning horizon prob-
lem may have more than one open-loop Nash equilibrium. Moreover it shows
that it is possible that the ﬁnite-planning horizon has no solution whereas a
solution to the inﬁnite-planning horizon exists.
Example 14:






Then, the eigenvalues of matrix M are { 5
22,1.8810,0.1883, 1
2,−1.7966}. Nu-
merical calculation of the corresponding eigenspaces shows that Kpos has
3 diﬀerent stabilizing elements. So, according the previous theorem, the
inﬁnite-planning horizon game has 3 open-loop Nash equilibria.
On the other hand it can be shown, by constructing ﬁnal cost matrices K1f
and K2f using the same procedure as in example 4, that matrix H(t)a te . g .
t =0 .1 is not always invertible. In other words, though the inﬁnite-planning
horizon problem has solutions, a solution to the corresponding ﬁnite-planning
horizon problem may fail to exist. 
On the other hand one might hope that, if the ﬁnite-planning horizon al-
ways has a unique solution, then this solution always converges to a solution
of the inﬁnite-planning horizon case. That this conjecture is false is illus-
trated by the next example:
Example 15:
Reconsider example 4 (continued) with the following notation: T := (T11 T12 T2 T3 T4 T5).











22 10 00 0
0 −5
22 00 0 0
00 −1.8810 0 0 0
00 0 −0.1883 0 0
00 0 0 −1
2 0



























we have that both K1f and K2f are semi-positive deﬁnite. Numerical calcula-
tion shows that with these choices for the ﬁnal cost, the determinant of H(t)
equals approximately −0.02907 ∗ e−0.6883t +2 .419 ∗ e1.6083t − 1.390 ∗ e1.2966t.
From this we see that H(t) is invertible for every positive t. So, the ﬁnite-
planning horizon problem has a unique equilibrium for every tf. On the other
hand, it is clear from theorem 10 that the equilibrium solution converges to
the solution that can be calculated from (XT
0 Y T
0 ZT
0 )T := (T3 T5) (that is
the eigenspaces corresponding with the two largest eigenvalues of M, -0.1883
and 1.7966). So, the converged equilibrium solution is not a ”stabilizing so-
lution”. In other words the equilibrium solution does not converge to an
equilibrium solution of the inﬁnite-planning horizon game. 






tations show that we obtain an inﬁnite-planning horizon problem which has
three equilibria. This, although matrix A is stable. We conclude this section
by showing that if both players discount their future welfare loss by a factor
that is large enough, this phenomenon does not occur anymore. That is, in
that case the game has generically a unique Nash equilibrium.
So, we consider next the case that the performance criterion player i =1 ,2











where r ≥ 0 is the discount factor.
Then, introducing ˜ x(t): =e− 1
2rtx(t)a n d˜ ui(t): =e− 1
2rtui(t), we see that the













˙ ˜ x =( A −
1
2
rI)˜ x + B1˜ u1 + B2˜ u2, ˜ x(0) = x0. (18)





Q1 (AT − 1
2rI)0
Q2 0( AT − 1
2rI)

,h a s2 n stable eigenvalues and
n unstable ones if r is chosen large enough.
VI. The scalar case and an economic example
We start this section by showing that matrix H(tf), as mentioned in the-
orem 5, is always invertible if the dimensions of both the state and the input
variables in system (1) equal one. This implies that for this kind of sys-
tems the usually stated assertion that the open-loop Nash strategy is given
by (8,9) is correct and, moreover, that the associated Riccati equations yield
the appropriate solution. Note that this case may be also considered as a spe-
cial situation as considered by Abou-Kandil et al (1986) and Feucht (1994),
where they show directly that the set of associated Riccati equations has a
solution.
To prove the invertibility of matrix H(tf) we ﬁrst calculate the exponential
of matrix M. To stress the fact that we are dealing with the scalar case, we
will put the system parameters in lower case, so e.g. a instead of A.
Lemma 16:


























(s1q1 + s2q2) s1(a − µ) s2(a − µ)
0 −2q2µ 2q1µ
−(s1q1 + s2q2) −s1(a + µ) −s2(a + µ)

,
with the determinant of V , detV =2 µ(s1q1+s2q2), and µ =
 
a2 + s1q1 + s2q2.
Proof:
Straightforward multiplication shows that we can factorize M as M = V diag(a,µ,−µ)V −1.
So (see e.g. Lancaster et al (1985, theorem 9.4.3)), the exponential of matrix
M, eMs,i sa ss t a t e da b o v e . 
20Next consider the matrix H(tf) from theorem 5 for an arbitrarily chosen







. Using the expres-











Clearly, H(tf) is positive for every tf ≥ 0. This implies in particular that
H(tf) diﬀers from zero for every tf ∈ [0,t 1], whatever t1 > 0 is. So from
theorem 5 we now immediately have the following conclusion.
Theorem 17:













Here k1(t)a n dk2(t) are the solutions of the coupled asymmetric Riccati-type
diﬀerential equations
˙ k1 = −ak1 − k1a − q1 + k
2
1s1 + k1s2k2; k1(tf)=k1f
˙ k2 = −ak2 − k2a − q2 + k
2
2s2 + k2s1k1; k2(tf)=k2f.
Furthermore, Φ(t,0) satisﬁes the transition equation
˙ Φ(t,0) = (a − s1k1 − s2k2)Φ(t,0); Φ(0,0) = 1.
Here si = 1
riib2
i,i=1 ,2. 
The next theorem shows that in the scalar case the equilibrium solution
always converges.
Theorem 18:
Assume that s1q1 + s2q2 > 0.
Then, the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution from theorem 17 converges

















s1q1+s2q2 and k2 =
(a+µ)q2
s1q1+s2q2.
Moreover, these strategies are the unique solution to the inﬁnite-planning
horizon open-loop problem.
Proof:
Since s1q1+s2q2 > 0, it is clear from (19) that M is dichotomically separable.
Furthermore we showed above that the well-posedness assumption is always
satisﬁed in the scalar case. Note that µ>0. So, according to corollary
11 the open-loop Nash strategies converge to a stationary strategy whenever
kif,i =1 ,2, are such that s1q1 + s2q2 + s1(a − µ)k1f + s2(a − µ)k2f  =0 .
Now consider the case that s1q1 +s2q2 +s1(a−µ)k1f +s2(a−µ)k2f =0 . To
study this case, reconsider (23) and (24) for tf →∞ . Elementary spelling
out of these formulas, using (19), shows that also in this case both k1(0,t f)
and k2(0,t f) converge to the limits as advertised above. Finally, note that
Kpos contains, independent of the sign of a, exactly one stabilizing solution.
Using the results of theorem 12 this concludes the proof. 
We conclude this section by illustrating the computational advantages of
our approach in an economic example. The example is taken from van Aarle
et al. (1995). In this paper they analyze a diﬀerential game on government
debt stabilization. They assume that government debt accumulation ( ˙ d)i s
the sum of interest payments on government debt (rd(t)) and primary ﬁscal
deﬁcits (f(t)) minus the seignorage (i.e., the issue of base money) (m(t)):
˙ d(t)=rd(t)+f(t) − m(t),d(t0)=d0. (20)
Here d(t),f(t)a n dm(t) are expressed as fractions of GDP and r represents
the rate of interest on outstanding government debt minus the growth rate
of output. r is assumed to be exogenous. They assume that ﬁscal and
monetary policies are controlled by diﬀerent institutions, the ﬁscal authority
and the monetary authority, respectively, which have diﬀerent objectives.
The objective of the ﬁscal authority is to minimize a sum of time proﬁles of








2 +η(m(t)− ¯ m)
2 +λ(d(t)− ¯ d)
2}e
−δ(t−t0)dt. (21)
Whereas the monetary authorities set the growth of base money so as to







{(m(t) − ¯ m)




κ can be interpreted as a measure for the conservatism of the central
bank w.r.t. the money growth. Furthermore all variables denoted with a bar
22are assumed to be ﬁxed targets which are given a priori.
Introducing x1(t): =( d(t) − ¯ d)e− 1
2δt,x 2(t): =( r¯ d + ¯ f − ¯ m)e− 1
2δt,u 1(t): =
(f(t) − ¯ f)e− 1
2δt and u2(t): =( m(t) − ¯ m)e− 1
2δt the above game can be rewrit-




























,R 11 =1a n dR22 =1 .





2δ,l,−l}, where l :=
 
κ + λ +( r − 1
2δ)2. The corresponding eigenspaces
are:
T1 = Span{T1} where T1 =( 000001 )
T,
T2 = Span{T2} where T2 =( 000100 )
T,
T3 = Span{T3} where T3 =( −(r − δ)δδ (λ + κ + r(r − δ)) κ δκδ λλ )
T,
T4 = Span{T4} where T4 =( 00 − r − 1 r 1)
T,
T5 = Span{T5} where T5 =(
1
2










T6 = Span{T6} where T6 =( (
1
2






δ − l) κλ (
1
2
δ − l) λ)
T.
So, the only stabilizing equilibrium strategy according theorem 12 is obtained
by considering the eigenspaces corresponding to the eigenvalues 1
2δ and l.
This gives rise to ui = −BT








−(r − δ)δ 1
2δ − r + l






In particular this implies that the equilibrium strategies satisfy the relation-
ship u2(t)=−λ
κu1(t). Or, stated diﬀerently, m(t)=¯ m(t) − λ
κ(f(t) − ¯ f(t)).












λ+κ−r(δ−r). Note that we implicitly assumed here that λ + κ +
r(r − δ) diﬀers from zero; a technical assumption which is not crucial.
The advantages of this approach are clear. First, it gives more insight into
the problem. That is, we obtain in an elementary way the optimal strategies
and thus the closed-loop dynamics of the problem. This makes it e.g. addi-
tionally possible to state an exact condition (i.e. 1
2δ − l<0) under which
the analysis performed by van Aarle et al. holds and what happens if this
23condition is violated. Second, the approach can be straightforwardly gener-
alized to multi-dimensional systems and is numerically easily implementable.
VII. Concluding remarks
In this paper we reconsidered the existence and asymptotic behaviour of
open-loop Nash equilibrium solutions in the two-player linear quadratic game.
Furthermore, we analyzed the inﬁnite-planning horizon game in a rigorous
mathematical way. We formulated both necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for this open problem, which can be computationally easily veriﬁed. To link
the results on the inﬁnite-planning horizon game with convergence results for
the ﬁnite-planning horizon game we reformulated and proved some existing
results on the ﬁnite-planning horizon game in a geometric way.
The ﬁnite-planning horizon game was analyzed starting from its basics: the
Hamiltonian equations. We derived necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium solution in terms of a full
rank condition on a modiﬁed fundamental matrix. We showed by means of an
example that in general a solution to the set of associated diﬀerential Riccati
equations may fail to exist whereas an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution
exists. Furthermore, we showed that solvability of these Riccati equations
is equivalent to existence of a Nash solution at every point of time during
a ﬁxed time interval. To study convergence of the open-loop equilibrium
solution, if the planning horizon is extended to inﬁnity, we therefore studied
the asymptotic behavior of the Riccati diﬀerential equations. To that end we
ﬁrst considered the existence of real solutions for the corresponding algebraic
Riccati equations. We showed how every real solution to (ARE) can be cal-








Furthermore we showed how the eigenvalues of the system, if the correspond-
ing feedback control strategies are used in (1), are related to the eigenvalues
of this matrix.
The results on the existence of real solutions to (ARE) were used to show that
if the dimension of the direct sum of the invariant subspaces corresponding
with the n largest eigenvalues (counted with algebraic multiplicities) equals
n, then generically the ﬁnite-planning horizon solution of the game converges
to a solution which can be directly calculated from this direct sum. Moreover
we showed that, if this solution stabilizes the closed-loop system, this strat-
egy will also be an equilibrium for the inﬁnite-planning horizon game. By
means of two examples we illustrated that convergence of the ﬁnite-planning
horizon strategy is neither a necessary nor a suﬃcient condition for existence
of an inﬁnite-planning horizon equilibrium strategy.
The solution structure of all inﬁnite-planning horizon equilibrium strategies
24is completely determined by those invariant subspaces which have the above
mentioned stabilization property. In an example we illustrated that, even if
matrix A is stable, the game may have more than one equilibrium. In case
a discounting factor is included in the performance function, that is large
enough, we showed that there will be only one equilibrium (generically).
Since there are a number of applications which just involve scalar systems
we concluded the paper by a detailed analysis of that case. We showed that
for those systems, the unique open-loop Nash equilibrium solution can al-
ways be found by solving the associated set of Riccati diﬀerential equations.
Moreover, this solution converges to a stationary strategy which is the unique
solution of the inﬁnite-planning horizon game.
It will be clear that there are still a number of open problems in this area. In
particular it remains a challenge for future research to get a better intuition
and understanding why sometimes solutions to this open-loop problem exist
whereas under some slight modiﬁcations they fail to exist. Finally we note
that the obtained results can be straightforwardly generalized to the N player
game.
We believe that the presented results are of interest in the analysis of, e.g.,
policy coordination problems. In particular our analysis shows that the ques-
tion which equilibrium to choose, a well-known problem if one deals with
feedback-strategies, also applies for open-loop problems. We saw that in
principle one can proceed in two ways to get (sometimes) around this prob-
lem. Either by discounting future welfare loss by a factor that is ”large
enough”, or by considering the converged ﬁnite-planning horizon strategy.
However, neither of both approaches guarantees existence of a unique open-
loop strategy for the inﬁnite-planning game.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 6:






















(−A + S1K1 + S2K2).














J, for some matrix J and matrix X invertible, which completes this
part of the proof.
” ⇐ ” This part has been proved in a more general context by Meyer in
25(1976). However, since the last statement of the theorem can be immediately
deduced from the following proof, we present this part of the proof here too.
























Spelling out the left hand side of this equation gives














which immediately yields that J = −A + S1K1 + S2K2. Substitution of this
equality into the right hand side of the equality shows then that Q1+ATK1 =
K1(−A+S1K1+S2K2)a n dQ2+ATK2 = K2(−A+S1K1+S2K2), or stated
diﬀerently, K1,K 2 satisfy (ARE). This proves the second part of the theorem.
As already noted above, the last statement of the theorem concerning the
spectrum of the matrix −A + S1K1 + S2K2 follows directly from the above












−A + S1K1 + S2K2 S1 S2
0 AT − K1S1 −K1S2
0 −K2S1 AT − K2S2

,
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 10
To study the convergence of Ki(0,t f) we reconsider (13) and (14). From
t h e s ef o r m u l a sw eh a v et h a t






























































 ⊕ V2 =I R
3n,
there exists an invertible matrix V22 ∈ IR


























and σ(Ji)=σ(M|Vi), i =1 ,2.
Using this, we can rewrite K1(0,t f)a n dK2(0,t f) in (23,24) as ˜ Gi(tf) ˜ H−1(tf),
i =1 ,2, where













































Here λn is the element of σ(M|V1) which has the smallest real part.
Next, consider ˜ G1(tf) − Y0X
−1
0 ˜ H(tf).












































27As e−λntfeJ2tf converges to zero for tf →∞ , it is obvious now that ˜ G1(tf)−
Y0X
−1
0 ˜ H(tf) converges to zero for tf →∞ . Similarly it can be shown that
also ˜ G2(tf) − Z0X
−1
0 ˜ H(tf) converges to zero for tf →∞ . To conclude from
this that K1(0,t f) → Y0X
−1
0 ,a n dK2(0,t f) → Z0X
−1
0 , it suﬃces to show
that ˜ H−1(tf) remains bounded for tf →∞ . This follows, however, directly






Proof of Theorem 12
To prove this theorem we ﬁrst need a property on the structure of U.
Note that U depends on the initial state of the system . For simplicity of
notation we omit, however, this dependency. Furthermore, it is clear that
ui(.) ∈ L2, the set of square integrable functions, but that U is not a linear
subspace of L2. First, since the zero-function will in general not belong to U
and, second, in general with v,w ∈ U, v + w  ∈ U. However, U does satisfy
the following important property:
Lemma:
Assume that both v and v +w are an element of U. Then for any real   also
v +  w ∈ U.
Proof:
First we introduce some notation.
Let xu denote the state trajectory obtained by using the control function u,
that is, xu(t): =eAtx0 +
  t
0 eA(t−τ)(B1 B2)u(τ)dτ.
Since by assumption both v and v + w belong to U, xv(t)a n dxv+w(t)c o n -
verge to zero if t →∞ .S o ,xv(t) − xv+w(t)=
  t
0 eA(t−τ)(B1 B2)w(τ)dτ → 0,
if t →∞ . Moreover, since both xv and xv+w are square integrable, also
the righthandside of the above equation is square integrable. Now, con-
sider xv+ w(t). Elementary calculation shows that xv+ w(t)=xv+w(t)−(1−
 )
  t
0 eA(t−τ)(B1 B2)w(τ)dτ. So, using the above result, it is clear that xv+ w(t)
is square integrable. Moreover, since both v and v +w are square integrable
it follows that w h a st ob es q u a r ei n t e g r a b l et o o . F r o mt h i sf o l l o w st h e n
immediately that also v +  w is square integrable.
Combining both results gives then that limtf→∞ Ji(v +  w) < ∞,i=1 ,2.
Which implies that v +  w ∈ U. 
The proof of the theorem reads now as follows
28” ⇒ ” To prove this part we use the variational approach (see e.g. Friedman
(1971) and Lukes and Russell (1971)).
Suppose that ¯ u1, ¯ u2 are a Nash solution. That is,
J1(u1, ¯ u2) ≥ J1(¯ u1, ¯ u2)a n dJ2(¯ u1,u 2) ≥ J2(¯ u1, ¯ u2). (26)







¯ u1 + w
¯ u2
 
∈ U we have,
according the above stated lemma, that for any real number  
J1( ): =J1(¯ u1 +  w, ¯ u2) ≥ J1(¯ u1, ¯ u2). (27)






¯ u1 +  w
¯ u2
 
, respectively. Then it is easily veriﬁed that (see
a l s op r o o fo ft h el e m m a )
x¯ u+ w(t)=x¯ u(t)+ g(t), (28)
where g(t): =
  t
0 eA(t−s)B1w(s)ds is a square integrable function.







f(t, ): =( x¯ u(t)+ g(t))
TQ1(x¯ u(t)+ g(t))+(¯ u1(t)+ w(t))
TR11(¯ u1(t)+ w(t)).









Using the facts that g(t),w(t)a n d¯ u1(t) are square integrable, it is obvious
now that
∂f
∂  is integrable for, e.g., all   ∈ [−1,1]. Using standard arguments











From (27) we get
dJ1( )
d 
| =0 =0 . (29)




T(t)R11¯ u1(t)}dt =0 .
29Substitution of the expression for g(t) into this equation and then interchang-












T(t)R11¯ u1(t)dt =0 .















T(t)R11¯ u1(t)dt =0 .









AT(s−t)Q1x¯ u(s)ds + R11¯ u1(t))]e
−λtei,i=1 ,..,n,
where λ is an arbitrary real number larger than the spectral radius of matrix
A and ei is the i-th standard basis vector in IR
n. Then it is clear that for




















Next, we introduce the vector v := (vT
1 vT
2 vT
3 )T as follows: v1(t): =x¯ u(t),
v2(t): =
  ∞
t eAT(s−t)Q1x¯ u(s)ds and v3(t): =
  ∞
t eAT(s−t)Q2x¯ u(s)ds.T h e n
¯ u1 = −R
−1
11 BT
1 v2(t)a n d¯ u2 = −R
−1
22 BT
2 v3(t). Moreover, it is easily veriﬁed by








v(t), with v1(0) = x0. (32)
Since by assumption for arbitrary x0, v(t) converges to zero, it follows that





















Λ. Writing out these equations yields then the advertised result.
”⇐”L e tK1,K 2 be any pair of solutions satisfying the algebraic Riccati
equations (ARE) and the additional constraint that the eigenvalues of A −


















1 K1e(A−S1K1−S2K2)tx0. Since a similar reasoning shows that
minu2 limtf→∞ J2(u∗
1,u 2) ≥ limtf→∞ J1(u∗
1,u ∗
2), we have by deﬁnition that
(u∗
1,u ∗
2) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
To prove this claim, we ﬁrst note that by substituting u∗












dτ[e−Aτe(A−S1K1−S2K2)τ]x0dτ. Evaluating this expression
by on the one hand carrying out the diﬀerentiation w.r.t. τ a n do nt h eo t h e r














































































31Since, by assumption, K1 and K2 satisfy (ARE) we can rewrite Q1 as:
Q1 = −A
TK1 − K1(A − S1K1 − S2K2)





































Due to our assumption that all eigenvalues of A − S1K1 − S2K2 are sta-
ble and the fact that J1(u∗
1,u ∗
2) < ∞, which implies that we may assume
without loss of generality (note that Q1 > 0∀x ∈<A |B1 > in J1)t h a t
limtf→∞
  tf
0 eA(tf−τ)B1v(τ)dτ exists, we have from the last equation that

















The rest of the proof follows now by completion of squares. Substitution of






















































Using standard arguments it follows now immediately from this formula that
limtf→∞ J1(u1,u ∗
2) is minimal by choosing u1(t)=u∗
1(t). Moreover, its mini-
mal value is
  ∞
0 {(e(A−S1K1−S2K2)tx0)T(Q1 + KT
1 S1K1)e(A−S1K1−S2K2)tx0dt. 
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